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The Empirics of International Currencies: Historical Evidence* 
Using a new database for the late 19th century, when the pound sterling 
circulated all over the world, this paper provides the first review of critical 
empirical issues in the economics of international currencies. First, we report 
evidence in favor of the search-theoretic approach to international currencies. 
Second, we give empirical support to strategic externalities. Third, we provide 
strong confirmation of the existence of persistence. Finally, we reject the view 
that the international monetary system is subject to pure path dependency in 
that it cannot remain locked into some past equilibrium. Our conclusion is that, 
for the late 19th century at least, money and trade were complements. 
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“For better or worse – and opinions differ on this –  
the choice of which language and which currency 
 is made not on merit, or moral worth, but on size.” 
(Kindleberger 1967, p. 11) 
 
One century ago, the United States set up a special expert body, known as the National 
Monetary Commission, to discuss ways and means to provide for a better management of the 
U.S. dollar and in particular to promote its role as an international currency. The U.S. National 
Monetary Commission led to creation of the Federal Reserve System and establishment of a 
large market of dollar “acceptances” that facilitated foreign holdings of the U.S. currency 
(Meltzer 2003). In the following decades, the dollar began an unchallenged ascent that 
transformed it into the world currency we know today. 
Recently, however, the advent of a single European currency, mounting U.S. external 
indebtedness, and the rise of China have fueled considerable interest in determining whether this 
leadership is here to stay. Discussion of whether the dollar is at risk of losing its international 
currency role has become widespread in policy circles.  
It is generally agreed that monetary leadership confers substantial benefits. One such benefit 
is easier management of external imbalances, because the market for assets denominated in a 
leading currency is liquid: think of the United States today. Estimates put the annual benefits to 
the United States of the dollar’s key currency role at 2 percent of U.S. gross domestic product 
(Gourinchas and Rey 2005). In contrast, countries with exotic currencies are led to denominate 
their debts in foreign currency. They become vulnerable to crises: think of Indonesia in 1997. 
Research has set the cost for emerging countries of not being able to denominate their debts in 
domestic currency at U.S. $107 billion annually (Eichengreen 2004). 
But applied research sheds little light on the sources of monetary leadership. In particular, the 
existing empirical literature does not take advantage of modern theory’s critical advances. This 
paper brings new data and methods to bear on this topic. We focus on the late 19th century, 
when the pound sterling was the ruling currency. Because of free capital mobility and lack of 
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exchange controls, this period provides a unique natural experiment to study the forces through 
which international currencies emerge. 
In this paper, we exploit insights from a new dataset constructed and described in previous 
joint research (Flandreau and Jobst 2005). This database records information on the currencies 
that were actually traded in every foreign exchange market circa 1900, and thus captures neatly 
the intriguing phenomenon of foreign circulation. We study it by using insights from modern 
theories of international money. These theories have three distinct features: they suggest that the 
emergence of international currencies is predicated on the existence of transaction costs; they 
emphasize the role of strategic externalities; and they predict various degrees of persistence in 
monetary leadership. Although these insights have so far remained fairly abstract and detached 
from empirical concerns, this paper reports strong supportive evidence. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section I provides an overview of the 
main intuitions in existing theories of monetary leadership. Section II studies the determinants 
of foreign circulation, and Section III reports evidence of strategic externalities. Section IV 
addresses the issue of persistence of international currency status. We end with general 
conclusions and speculations for the future. 
 
I. The International Monetary System: Theory 
The central motivation of the theory of international currencies is to explain this remarkable 
phenomenon: In general, a few currencies dominate the international scene, and one member of 
the group secures preeminence (Matsuyama et al. 1993). This role was played by the Dutch 
guilder in the 17th and 18th century, by the pound sterling in the 19th and early 20th century, 
and by the U.S. dollar since the mid-20th century. 
Following Menger (1892, p. 254), theoretical approaches to this phenomenon have 
emphasized the role of transaction costs in coordinating agents on a single currency. Agents 
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select as money the assets that entail the smallest difference between the price at which they can 
be acquired and the price at which they are resold (a difference also known as the bid-ask 
spread). In other words, “liquidity” is a primary  determinant of the emergence of a given 
currency. 
From this common thread, the literature has provided two alternative emphases. One, 
pioneered by Hayek’s work on currency competition, relates “liquidity” to underlying policies 
(Hayek 1976). For instance, monetary instability increases the transaction costs associated with 
using a given currency. This is because the resulting uncertainty makes agents less willing to 
accept that currency unless they are provided with a greater margin to cover them against future 
losses. Currencies whose value is beyond suspicion do not suffer from this flaw and so tend to 
displace the former ones (Calvo and Vegh 1992). Yet the resulting currency substitution does 
not imply that a single currency will dominate; rather, it implies that the number of currencies 
used internationally may be smaller than the number of existing currencies. 
Note also that currency substitution should have disciplinary effects on monetary authorities 
because it entails costs in the form of forgone seigniorage. This game-theoretic implication was 
anticipated by Hayek (1976, Chap. VIII, p. 48) and is also a central aspect of modern theories of 
credibility (Kydland and Prescott 1977; Barro and Gordon 1983). Li and Matsui (2005) have 
provided the first explicit application of this insight to the theory of international currency in the 
framework of the search-theoretic approach to money. Using a two-country, two-currency 
framework, they discuss the strategic interactions between governments that compete for 
seigniorage and face the possibility of currency substitution. 
The alternative view – pioneered by Kindleberger (1967) – is that transaction costs are 
determined by market size. Currencies with a large area of circulation are easily resold, for one 
can conveniently meet someone else who is willing to purchase them. One implication is that 
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international currencies are valuable because many other parties are using them,1 generating 
strategic externalities. This issue is discussed in a first family of models with cash-in-advance 
constraints (Krugman 1980; Rey 2001).2 Strategic externalities are captured by positing a unit 
cost function that is decreasing with the volume of transactions using a given vehicle currency: 
as more agents adopt the currency, the cost of using it also decreases. This creates persistence. 
Rising trade powers have difficulties pushing their currency to the top, since the established 
currencies tend to capture the market for new transactions. Therefore “history” determines 
current outcomes.3 
Matsuyama and colleagues (1993) and Kiyotaki and Wright (1993) provided rigorous search-
theoretic foundations for these insights. Their models focus on the transaction services that 
currencies provide in an uncertain matching environment. When an opportunity to trade occurs, 
agents holding the “wrong” currency suffer a utility loss compared to when holding the “right” 
one. Agents consistently try to adjust ex ante their holdings and so achieve optimality. Here 
again, strategic externalities emerge naturally because equilibrium outcomes are influenced by 
other agents’ choices. Depending on the model’s parameters, various degrees of persistence are 
also observed. 
Before we conclude this section, two remarks are in order. First, we emphasize that the 
approaches just identified are not mutually exclusive. As Ravikumar and Wallace (2001) 
remarked, the formalism introduced by Matsuyama et al. (1993) is well suited to the study of 
currency substitution. As a result, an expanding theoretical literature has combined the insights 
                                                 
1 . “World efficiency is achieved when all countries learn the same second language” (Kindleberger 1967, p. 9). 
2 . Note that Kindleberger himself backed away from this conclusion. However, some statements suggest that he 
briefly toyed with the idea. For instance, he argues that the selection of the dollar was “the work of circumstances” 
(1967, p. 10), which may be seen as a recognition of the possibility of multiple equilibria. 
3 . Krugman (1980, p. 523) argues that “it seems clear that history will matter. Once an exchange structure is 
established, it will persist… Suppose, for instance, that the currency of an economically dominant country becomes 
established as vehicle. This role will be self-reinforcing, swelling transactions in the currency. Even if the country’s 
predominant position vanishes, its currency’s special role may then persist. [This explains] the persistence of 
sterling’s role as a vehicle, long after British commercial preeminence had passed” (our italics). Krugman 
concludes that modern models “look as if they have something to do with the actual experience of international 
monetary history.”  
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from models of currency substitution with the rigorous foundations that can be gleaned from 
search-theoretic approaches to money (Craig and Waller 1999; Engineer 2000; Head and Shi 
2003; Peterson 2004). 
Second, the theoretical literature on international currencies has progressed with very limited 
support from actual data. Yet a simple look at the historical evidence reveals an empirical 
puzzle: If history is as important as modern models suggest, then how does one explain that 
today the U.S. dollar, not the pound sterling, is the world’s leading currency? This paper 
provides answers. 
 
II. The International Monetary System: Evidence 
A. Exchange Matrices: Theory and Data 
A theory of international circulation is one that explains why certain currencies circulate 
abroad while others don’t. To show how such theories should be tested, we build on Krugman’s 
concept of the “exchange structure” (Krugman 1980). Consider a world where there are n 
countries, each with one currency and one foreign exchange market. Let’s call aijkt the amount of 
currency i that has been sold against currency j on market k during period t. Recording aijkt for 
all i, j and k produces a three-dimensional matrix of dimension nxnxn. Krugman’s study 
considered a restriction of this general framework to a three-country world with consolidated 
clearing according to currency pairs, so that there were three potential foreign exchange markets 
and the exchange structure was the 3x3 symetrical matrix.4 
  Ξ =
⊗ a21 a31
a21 ⊗ a23
a31 a32 ⊗










.      (1) 
                                                 
4 . In a given market, exchanging currency i against currency j is the same as exchanging currency j against 
currency i, so symmetry obtains (aijk = ajik). In general, one would want to determine why bilateral exchange takes 
place in certain countries but not in others. For the sake of simplicity, this paper abstracts from this issue while 
recognizing its importance.  
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In this framework, a theory of international currencies is a set of arguments explaining why, 
in equilibrium, a minority of foreign exchange markets and currencies are used (aijkt > 0) while 
the majority is neglected (aijkt = 0). However, existing databases are inadequate to address this 
central question, owing to the very way information is collected. For example, the latest version 
of the Bank of International Settlements’ Triennial Survey (BIS 2005), the most comprehensive 
reference source for bilateral foreign exchange activity, documents 41 independent currencies. If 
all transactions were consolidated according to currency pairs then there would be 820 possible 
cells.5 But the Survey actually reports aggregate bilateral turnover for nine currency pairs only. 
As evidence from the financial press suggests and interviews with BIS statisticians confirm, this 
is only a fraction of all the relevant trades, and the complete list of existing routes is not known.6 
The use of such databases to test alternative assumptions on currency circulation is obviously 
inadequate as a result of the inherent selection bias. 
This selection bias is central to all empirical studies of which we are aware. For instance, 
Krugman (1984) and Rey (2001) provided casual discussions of the historical relation between 
trade and currency status, but their evidence is limited to fragmentary elements on two 
international currencies (the U.S. dollar and the pound sterling). Other works build on research 
on foreign exchange (FX) market microstructure: Frankel et al. (1996) and Hartmann (1998) 
sought to analyze the determinants of pair wise liquidity in FX markets. These studies have 
concentrated on explaining the time-series pattern of  bid-ask spreads for some leading bilateral 
foreign exchange markets, yet they have consistently ignored the reasons why a majority of 
currencies are never used.7 
                                                 
5 . nx(n-1)/2=820 when n=41. 
6 . Currency pairs not documented include “Nokkie-Stokkie” (Norwegian krone vs. Swedish krona), “Huf-Puf” 
(Hungarian forint vs. Polish zloty), “Kiwie-Aussie” (pretty obvious), and others: See Jennifer Hughes, “Non-dollar 
exchange traders hunting value cannot ignore US currency,” Financial Times (November 17, 2005). 
7 . An extension of this literature is Lyons and Moore (2005), who derive conditions under which information 
asymmetries cause transactions to be concentrated in a handful of currencies. 
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Another set of empirical studies has analyzed the determinants of the currency composition 
of international reserves. Researchers have studied the effects of factors such as the size of the 
issuing country and its record of price-level and exchange-rate stability (Dooley et al. 1977; 
Eichengreen and Frankel 1996; Eichengreen 1999; Eichengreen and Mathieson 2001; Chinn and 
Frankel 2005; Eichengreen 2005). Others have looked at the currency of denomination of 
international bond issues. Eichengreen and colleagues (2005) show that country size is the most 
important determinant of the currency denomination of international bond issues. Cohen (2005) 
finds that exchange-rate movements, interest differentials, and the installed base (the amount of 
home-country issuance) have the greatest influence on the currency shares of  international bond 
issues. But here again, since there is only data for those few currencies that are used as reserves 
or for debt denomination, these studies tell us nothing about why those particular currencies are 
selected in the first place. 
Finally, there are a few studies focusing on the currency denomination of trade. One recent 
contribution is Goldberg and Tille (2005); using data on the choice of invoicing currency for 24 
countries, they find that this choice depends on the amount of trade conducted with the issuing 
country and on business cycle considerations. Thus, available studies have in common a focus 
on the factors determining the relative importance of a small number of international currencies 
within foreign currency “portfolios”. But the research does not really address the reasons why 
international currencies exist.  
B. Monetary Status: A Limited-Dependent Analysis 
What is needed, therefore, is a database that distinguishes currencies with an international 
circulation from currencies without. In Flandreau and Jobst (2005) we collected precisely this 
kind of data for the late 19th century. That period was the heyday of a system that had 
developed in the late Middle Ages. Every national financial center featured a foreign exchange 
market where bankers bought and sold foreign currency “bills of exchange” or “foreign 
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exchange”, foreign currency time deposits) against domestic currency. These foreign exchange 
bills served to finance both commercial and capital transactions. In each center, local bulletins 
reported the fixing prices for foreign currencies that were actually traded. These publications 
can thus be viewed as spy ware devices that inform us whether or not a given foreign exchange 
route was used, recording “xij=0” if aijk=0 or “xij=1” if aijk>0. One can then use these xij to 
construct an exchange matrix Ω, which is a dichotomous mapping of the exchange structure:8 
 Ω =
∗ x12 x13 ... x1n
x21 ∗ ... ... ...
x31 ... ∗ ... ...
... ... ... ∗ xn−1n
xn1 ... ... ... ∗
















 .    (2) 
 The xij terms in the exchange matrix can be used to explain why certain currencies circulate 
abroad. 
The information in the exchange matrix for 1900 is summarized in Figure 1, which 
aggregates the xij for all i’s, ∀ j . This gives an indication of the international “popularity” of 
alternative currencies, since it shows the number of foreign markets where a given currency is 
traded. Unsurprisingly, the pound sterling is ranked first. 
Our strategy for explaining why the international monetary system looked the way it did in 
1900 is to analyze the availability of currency j in market i as reflecting rational decision 
making. If agents in market i find it valuable to trade currency j, then a foreign exchange quote 
will be posted in the local bulletin. Calling uij  the value of using currency j in market i, we can 
write the model as 
              1  if uij  > 0,  
 xij =    (3) 
              0  if uij ≤ 0 .  
                                                 
8 . Technically, the exchange matrix thus considers only trades against domestic currency, so that there are only 
two possible markets where trade in a given currency pair can take place. See note 6. 
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Here uij  may depend on any variable we wish. Calling yij the vector of variables influencing uij  
and assuming that it is a linear function of its arguments (β is a vector of parameters, ηij a 
random shock, F the cumulative distribution of ηij), we write 
 Pr(xij = 1) = Pr(yij ⋅ β +ηij ≥ 0) = 1− F(yij ⋅ β) . (4) 
To specify the arguments in the value function, we translate theoretical insights into the 
actual institutional setup of the time. As we shall see, this is a natural way to proceed, because it 
provides a historical motivation that is largely consistent with the insights from modern theories. 
Consider market i. There, any banker can in principle draw a draft denominated in any 
foreign currency, as this merely implies making international arrangements with correspondents. 
Resulting costs could then be passed on to customers, so the question then becomes whether 
these costs would generate enough value for customers to pay for it. If not, there would be no 
local demand and the market for such bills would dry up. Thus, in the end, one expects to 
observe a market only in those currencies in which it is advantageous to transact. 
We consider two families of explanatory factors. On the one hand, the currency substitution 
approach suggests that currencies with a higher risk of losing their value are penalized (Li and 
Matsui 2005). This may be the case if the country has a high inflation rate or displays exchange-
rate volatility. It may also be the case if the country has a high debt burden, a poor reputation, or 
a bad economic record, since these factors are commonly believed to be good predictors of 
currency depreciation. In the absence of reliable price data for a number of countries in the 
sample, we capture monetary stability by using a gold-standard dummy variable (Bordo and 
Rockoff 1996; Flandreau and Zumer 2004). This takes care not only of foreign exchange 
stability but also of price stability, since inflation is endogenous in a fixed-exchange-rate 
system. Consistent with our previous remarks, these variables are supplemented with fiscal and 
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reputation indicators.9 We measure the debt burden using the debt/GDP ratio (Flandreau et al. 
1998). We capture reputation using the yield on gold bonds issued in international markets. 
Finally, we measure economic performance using GDP per capita (Bordo and Rockoff 1996). 
We call this first group of variables good housekeeping factors.10 
The second group of variables is referred to as matching factors, which are inspired by a 
search-theoretic approach that emphasize searching costs. One important ingredient is inventory 
costs. For instance, Kiyotaki and Wright (1989, 1993) allow for heterogeneous costs of holding 
different currencies. Another important element is the probability of “meeting one’s match”. 
This probability may be reduced when agents are somehow “distant” from one another (see 
Matsuyama et al. (1993) and Kiyotaki and Moore (2003); see also Trejos and Wright (1996) and 
Ravikumar and Wallace (2001) for alternative interpretations). But, the probability of a meeting 
increases with the size of the trading partners (see e.g. Zhou 1997), a feature that is also 
emphasized in other approaches such as Rey (2001).  
Historical evidence provides a natural way to translate these theoretical insights into 
measurable factors. First, relevance of inventory costs is ascertained in historians’ discussions of 
bankers’ drawing techniques, whose logic really dated back to the latte Middle Ages. Because 
international exchange instruments (“bills”) were really international credit, bankers had to take 
into account interest rates, which reflected inventory costs. In his classic study of Renaissance 
finance, de Roover finds abundant anecdotal evidence of warnings against drawing bills on 
centers where interest rates are permanently or even temporarily high. For instance, one banker 
indicated that when interest rates were high in Barcelona, bankers in Florence and elsewhere 
refrained from drawing on that center: “laudiamo la rimessa ma non la tratta” (de Roover 1968, 
pp. 48-9). Flandreau and Gallice (2005) find similar evidence for the late 19th century. This 
                                                 
9 . Hayek (1976, Chap. VIII, p. 48) was the first to emphasize the limits of “gold discipline”. See also Flood and 
Garber (1984). 
10 . This was suggested to us by Mike Bordo. 
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suggests that bankers provided bills on centers where real interest rates were, on average, 
cheaper. 
The second factor we consider is frictions. Because foreign exchange bills were private 
promises to pay certain sums in certain places, issuing them involved an element of uncertainty 
in that foreign market’s conditions cannot be known as well as domestic ones. In addition, this 
greater uncertainty created more scope for moral hazard (on this issue in history, see e.g. 
Chapman 1984). Therefore, frictions were presumably greater for more distant centers than for 
closer ones. This can be viewed as an equivalent to the bilateral “distance” discussed in 
matching models. 
Finally, historians usually associate the development of drawing facilities with the existence 
of substantial trade. The study by King and colleagues (1988) of the Hong Kong and Shanghai 
Banking Corporation (HSBC) in the second half of 19th century provides many examples. For 
instance, the authors explain that one reason why HSBC opened a branch in France 
(specifically, in the silk processing city of Lyons) was because of the bank’s leading role in 
providing finance to the global silk trade and France’s substantial business as both an importer 
and producer of silk. From an economic point of view, the logic is that money follows trade. 
When bilateral trade with a given country is important, drawing a bill payable in its currency is 
attractive because it finds ready domestic purchasers who need them to settle international 
transactions. Therefore, bilateral trade with country j as a share of the total trade of country i 
should increase the probability of finding the currency of country j in market i. Again, this 
intuition has a natural counterpart in the search-theoretic approach to money. 
We assess the contribution of each group of factors by estimating equation (4) using both a 
logit and probit specification. We abstract at this stage from simultaneity issues, which will be 
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dealt with in detail in the remainder of the paper. Table 1 reports results. Given the similarity 
between logit and profit output, we limit ourselves to discussing the first part of the table. 11 
Column I reports parameter estimates for the general model. Two features stand out. First, 
the model’s fit is satisfactory in terms of both the pseudo-R2 and the percentage of currencies 
whose quotation is correctly predicted. Second, we notice a different performance between the 
two groups of controls identified before. On the one hand, matching variables perform very 
well. We observe that low short-term interest rates in the issuing country significantly increase 
the probability of its currency being traded abroad, that agents appear more willing, other things 
being equal, to trade currencies issued by geographically close countries, and that a greater 
bilateral trade with a given country is associated with a greater probability of using its currency. 
On the other hand, parameters for good housekeeping variables are much less satisfactory. 
Except for the debt burden, all are insignificant and some have the wrong sign.  
The alternative sets of explanatory factors are then tried independently. We first experiment 
with matching factors alone. They perform essentially as well as the general model. In contrast, 
when the good housekeeping factors are considered independently, the quality of the fit 
deteriorates markedly. Pseudo-R2 values are almost three times smaller than in the general 
model and some bizarre results emerge: for example, a significant large but negative 
contribution of the gold standard, exactly the opposite of what one would expect.12 Finally, as 
shown in the bottom part of the table, this specification does a poor job of predicting when 
currencies are quoted. 
                                                 
11 . Controls common to all regressions included a constant and a “coverage” factor, which was introduced to 
correct biases resulting from the heterogeneity of national statistical sources. (Parameter estimates without the 
coverage factor are identical, but coverage improves fit.) The extensiveness of the coverage of the foreign exchange 
market varied marginally from one national source to the other. We could not relate these differences to any 
meaningful economic variable and so concluded they were simply an artefact of the random characteristics of the 
source we used. Coverage is measured by the so-called expansiveness factor recommended in network 
econometrics (Wasserman and Faust 1994). 
12 . The distinction between colums IIIa and IIIb is motivated by the need to deal with possible multicolinearity 
between debt burdens and reputation, as suggested in Flandreau and Zumer (2004). 
 14
Two further exercises suggested by earlier readers are also provided. Column IV adds to the 
general model a colony dummy (=1 when a colony considers quoting its metropolis) in order to 
assess the potential effect of imperial links. The hypothesis we test is that the existence of an 
empire favors currency internationalization (see De Cecco 1974 for an early exposition). This 
variable turns out to have zero contribution, and other parameter estimates are unaffected. 
Finally,  Column V controls for the possibility that trade is endogenous to quotation; to do so, 
we substitute for trade the standard variables of the gravity equation. Again, estimates of other 
variables remain stable. 
The results of this exercise suggest that matching factors are very important. They also rule 
out one possible explanation for the poor performance of good housekeeping variables: that 
causality works through its influence on matching variables. This is demonstrated by the poor 
performance of good housekeeping when considered alone and by the correlation matrix of 
explanatory variables reported in Table 2, which indicates that multi-colinearity is not an issue. 
We suggest the following interpretation of our results. Good housekeeping variables relate 
the value of trading currency j in market i to country j’s characteristics, whereas matching 
factors are interactive terms that relate foreign circulation to bilateral characteristics such as 
distance or trade. Results show that bilateral characteristics are far more important. This 
evidence supports the “matching” dimension of the modern search-theoretic approaches money.  
III. Strategic Externalities: Empirical Evidence 
A. The Complete Model 
Yet if matching is important then there should also exist feedback between individual 
choices, because whether to use currency j in country i is decided given others’ decisions 
(Wright 1995, 1999). Consider again the model in equation (4). Let’s call xij
c  the exchange 
matrix that is equal to Ω except for term xij , which has been coded as missing; hence xij
c  
represents other agents’ decisions. We can therefore rewrite (4) as 
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 Pr(xij = 1) = Pr(yij ⋅ β +ηij ≥ 0 xij
c ) = Φ(yij ⋅ β +ηij , xij
c ) .  (5) 
In the language of game theory, function Φ  is the individual response function 
corresponding to a Nash strategy. Individual choices influence the response function of others, 
and equilibrium requires that ex post individual strategies be consistent with ex ante ones. 
Individual quoting decisions are jointly determined. This is the essence of strategic externalities 
– that xij
c  does influence xij . 
In this paper we explore one channel through which strategic externalities may operate. 
Specifically, we look at the effect that a large number of foreign quotations for a given country 
(i.e., “international currency status”) has on the liquidity of that country’s money market. In a 
nutshell, the argument we are about to test is whether the interest rates of leading currencies 
were lower because lots of agents were using them, so that (in turn) their currencies were more 
likely to be quoted abroad. 
This approach, obviously motivated by earlier theoretical consideration, is again guided by 
historical insights. On the one hand, narrative evidence that liquid financial centers tended to 
attract foreign exchange business is provided by Nishimura (1971). He shows that, in the late 
19th century, the share of bills drawn on London from outside the United Kingdom vastly 
surpassed the share drawn from within. In the words of another scholar, Lombard Street, where 
London’s money market was located, “belonged to all nations” (King 1936, p. 282). 
On the other hand, evidence that larger markets enjoyed lower interest rates is provided in 
contemporary discussions such as expert reports for the U.S. National Monetary Commission, 
whose concern was (among other things) to promote the international role of the U.S. dollar. 
One expert for the commission argued that, barring exchange risk, money interest rates should 
equalize consistently with the interest parity condition – but only up to a liquidity premium. 
This premium would always be positive for narrower markets, because moving from a less 
liquid to a more liquid currency entails greater costs than moving the opposite direction. 
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Intuitively, assets that could be bought and sold on broader markets would trade at a higher 
price (i.e., a lower interest rate). In the words of one expert: 
Thus it is that funds freely move to and fro between London, Paris, Berlin, and 
Amsterdam, an exact equality in [interest] rates being prevented by the fact that the 
discount markets in these cities differ in size… For instance, the Paris discount market is 
broader than that of Amsterdam, and there is consequently less risk in forwarding funds to 
Paris for investment than to Amsterdam. That the Paris discount rate should rule 
somewhat lower than that of Amsterdam is accordingly natural.13  
In effect, Jacobs reasoned here in terms of strategic externalities. Attractive interest rates in 
London, he acknowledged, led U.S. bankers to hold London balances even though this would 
“add to the importance of London and militate against the development of New York as a 
financial center.”14  
Empirical evidence of the relation suggested by Jacobs is provided in Figure 2. The figure 
shows that, the larger the number of foreign quotations a currency received, the lower was its 
interest rate. Of course Figure 2 is consistent with causality running either way or both, so it 
provides no decisive evidence on that score. 
To examine this matter rigorously, we formalize the argument in a simple framework. Let rjt 
be the interest rate in center j at a date t. This interest rate can be written in terms of an 
imaginary, perfectly liquid, short-term financial instrument whose interest rate is at. The spread 
between rjt and at is by definition equal to the sum of a liquidity premium and the expected rate 
of exchange-rate change with respect to the imaginary currency (used as numéraire). The 
liquidity premium is assumed to depend on two terms, the demand for currency i in the global 
foreign exchange market (ωi ) and a set of variables that represents local money market 
                                                 
13 . Jacobs (1910), pp. 7-8; our italics. 
14 . Ibid., p. 13. 
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development (Y1t). Denoting the liquidity premium by π(ωit ,Y1it )  and the expected depreciation 
by E(∆eit+1 / eit ) , we have 
 rit − at = π(ωit ,Y1it ) + E(∆eit+1 / eit ) .   (5) 
As already stated, many countries were on fixed exchange rates (gold standard), and those 
that floated did not exhibit systematic trends. Therefore, expected depreciation can safely be 
ignored. (Regressions limited to countries on a gold standard were also performed and did not 
change the results.) The demand for currency i in the global foreign exchange market is the sum 
of individual demands in local markets weighted by the relative share θk of each country. 
Country k’s demand for currency i is a function of its (unobservable) utility uki. Finally, interest 
rates in market i are determined by international demand and domestic factors:  
 rit = γ1 θk ⋅ ukit
k≠i
∑ +Y1i ⋅ β1 +εit .  (6) 
This formula can be combined with the “matching” equation estimated in Section II where 
the value of holding currency j in market i is a function of the interest rate in market j, the share 
of bilateral trade with j in i’s total trade, and bilateral distance. Denoting these latter two 
exogenous variables by Y2ij, we can write 
 uijt = γ2 ⋅ rjt +Y2ijt ⋅ β2 +ηijt .  (7) 
Since ri is an nx1 vector (there are n countries) and since uij is a vector of dimension n(n–1)x1 
(there are n(n–1) bilateral exchange markets), we use the transformation matrices W and M to 
write the complete model in structural form as follows (we drop the indices for simplicity):15  
 r = γ1 ⋅W ⋅ u +Y1 ⋅ β1 +ε
u = γ2 ⋅ M ⋅ r +Y2 ⋅ β2 +η.
  (8) 
As can be seen, interest rates in a given market depend on the value that foreigners find in 
using that currency (first equation). Conversely, the value of holding a given foreign currency 
                                                 
15 . Here W is weighting matrix, and M simply assures that all markets for currency j depend on the same 
interest rj. 
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depends on the corresponding interest rate (second equation). The result is a two-way influence 
between interest rates and utilities. To summarize, equation (8) describes the international 
monetary system that results from a Nash equilibrium as described by a system of simultaneous 
equations. 
Figure 3 illustrates the two-way feedback for a given country. The first equation in system 
(8) is the liquidity schedule; it describes the incidence of greater value of the domestic currency 
for foreigners on domestic interest rates. The second equation is the popularity schedule, which 
describes the incidence of lower domestic rates on the value of holding that currency for 
foreigners. Equilibrium is defined by point E. 
B. Estimation 
Because of simultaneity, it will not be enough to estimate the second equation using a 
standard probit method and then estimate the first equation using the predicted utility variable 
obtained from the first regression. One way of adressing this issue is to think of (8) as a 
sequential system. At date t–1, agents make decisions regarding currency holdings based on the 
signals they receive (second equation). This determines the demand for each currency in each 
market and sets period–t interest differentials (first equation). Rewriting (8) with time indices 
yields 
 
rt = γ1 ⋅W ⋅ ut +Y1t ⋅ β1 +εt
ut = γ2 ⋅ M ⋅ rt −1 +Y2t ⋅ β2 +ηt .
  (10) 
Given that εt  and ηt  are well-behaved Gaussian residuals, a straight estimation is possible: first 
derive a probit estimate of the second equation; then replace ut in the first equation by its fitted 
value and use standard OLS techniques to estimate the equation 
 rt = γ1 ⋅W ⋅ uˆt +Y1t ⋅ β1 +εt .  (11) 
However, superior approach is to recognize that r and u are simultaneously determined. For 
this it we must first rewrite the system in reduced form (time indices dropped for simplicity): 
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r = In − γ1 ⋅ γ2 ⋅W ⋅ M( )
−1 ⋅ Y1 ⋅ β1 + γ2 ⋅W ⋅Y2 ⋅ β2( )+ In − γ1 ⋅ γ2 ⋅W ⋅ M( )
−1 εt + γ2 ⋅W ⋅η( )
u = In(n−1) − γ2 ⋅ γ1 ⋅ M ⋅W( )
−1
⋅ γ1 ⋅ M ⋅Y1 ⋅ β1 +Y2 ⋅ β2( )+ In(n−1) − γ2 ⋅ γ1 ⋅ M ⋅W( )
−1
⋅ γ1 ⋅ M ⋅ ε +η( ).
(12) 
Because ε and η are i.i.d., an unbiased estimation of the reduced-form system is feasible using 
maximum likelihood techniques. This provides fitted values of rˆ  and uˆ  that are orthogonal to 
residuals; then rˆ  and uˆ  can be plugged back into the structural system (8). The second step in 
this approach involves OLS estimation of the first equation and probit estimation of the second 
equation. This estimation strategy, known as two-stage probit least squares (or 2SPLS), 
produces robust estimates (see Maddala 1984).16 
Results are reported in Table 3. For domestic variables (Y1) we used GDP per capita (a 
measure of domestic development) and a democracy index. Neo institutional perspectives have 
emphasized the role of democratic institutions, parliamentary control of the executive, and the 
rule of law in financial development (North and Weingast 1989; Bordo and Rousseau 2005). 
Democracy is therefore a natural proxy for these factors.  
Table 3 presents estimates for (I) the “naïve” model that ignores that r and u are jointly 
determined, (II) the sequential model that assumes agents decide on foreign currency trading for 
1900 based on signals received in 1890 (thus setting 1900 interest rates), and (III) the more 
sophisticated 2SPLS model. There is little difference between the output of the naïve and 
sequential models. However, compared to columns I and II, 2SPLS estimation gives an 
enhanced effect of interest rate on the utility of holding the corresponding currency (γ2=–0.52 
instead of –0.31 and –0.36). The effect of the popularity of a given currency on interest rates, by 
contrast, is similar across equations (γ1=–0.89, –0.91 and –1.12). 
The important conclusion to draw from these exercises is that we find evidence of the two-
way causality (from transaction costs to holding behavior and from holding behavior to 
transaction costs) that is a central feature of modern models of international currencies. There 
                                                 
16 . Note, however, that the standard errors are not consistent owing to spatial correlation. 
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are strategic externalities, and they matter. The next section discusses the extent of their 
importance. 
 
IV. Persistence 
A. Testing for Path Dependency 
The most important effect suggested by the theory of strategic externalities is persistence. To 
see this, consider the following thought experiment. Suppose that, starting from a situation of 
equilibrium at E, the economy under consideration experiences an increase of its total exports. 
The result is that the value of holding its currency abroad is enhanced. This boosts international 
demand for its money, causing further declines of its interest rate. Interest-rate declines provide 
a further boost, and so forth. The long-run effect depends critically on the product of parameters 
γ1 and γ2. Assuming for simplicity that γ1γ2>0 (as we have found is the case), two main regimes 
are to be distinguished.17 
First, if 0<γ1γ2<1 then there will be persistence but no path dependence, since the economy 
will be converging toward a new equilibrium. However while the process losts, the country has 
higher interest rates and lower popularity than is warranted by the long-run equilibrium. 
Formerly minor trading powers, for instance, drag the anchor of their previous insignificance 
and experience a delayed rise to monetary leadership (Figure 4a). 
Second, if γ1γ2>1 then the dynamics are explosive. Interest-rate declines fuel an expansion of 
foreign holdings, which encourages reduction in liquidity premiums until they become zero and 
the greatest possible number of foreigners hold the currency. Moreover, there are no 
compensating forces and so important currencies become increasingly important while 
unimportant ones go the other way. This situation is that of a lock-in effect (a specific instance 
of path dependency). Escape from such an equilibrium is both delayed and brutal. Intuitively, it 
                                                 
17 . We neglect here the degenerate regime where γ1γ2=1, since it is statistically unimportant.  
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arises when the liquidity popularity feedback is “big enough” (formally, when their product is 
greater than 1:Figure 4b).18 Table 3, column III, implies that γ1γ2=0.463, which is smaller than 1. 
The data thus suggests that there is persistence but no lock-in effects. 
B. A Counter Factual Assessment 
Having found evidence of historical persistence, it is interesting to delve further into the 
matter and provide an estimation of the actual contribution of “history” to 1900 international 
monetary architecture. One way to do this involves recognizing that, in our approach, the 
vehicles of persistence are interest rates and the value of holding given currencies. It is therefore 
possible to define two vectors that register the effect of past “events” as the difference between 
the actual values and long-run equilibrium values. As indicated, a country whose formerly small 
trading power has increased encounters higher interest rates and lower value for its currency 
than it “ought to”. We define these vectors as εHt  and ηHt , respectively. Formally: 
 
εH = r − rE
ηH = u − uE .
   (13) 
where rE and uE are defined as solutions to (hats denote estimated parameters from Table 3). 
 
rE = γˆ1 ⋅W ⋅ uE +Y1 ⋅ βˆ1
uE = γˆ2 ⋅ M ⋅ rE +Y2 ⋅ βˆ2 .
   (14) 
Because persistence acts in a symmetrical fashion for interest rates and the value of holding a 
given currency (as seen in Figure 4a), one need only examine persistence in a single dimension. 
We thus consider the matter by performing the intuitively appealing comparison between the 
actual popularity of currencies in 1900 (measured by the number of quotes each received in 
foreign markets) and equilibrium popularity (measured by computing the counterfactual, 
“history free” numbers for quotes each currency ought to have received as a solution to (14)). 
Figure 5 displays the results. It can be seen that the United States received substantially fewer 
quotes than if history had not taken place. The United States, a rising trade power, was 
                                                 
18 . For convenience, Figures 2.a and 2.b illustrate what happens when γ1=1 so that γ1γ2> 1 boils down to γ2>γ1. 
 22
penalized during its ascendancy. On the other hand, several European countries were actually 
much more popular than in the history-free scenario. The most striking example is France, 
which received about 25 percent more quotes than it would have sans history. France, a former 
world trade leader, enjoyed an substantial advantage from persistence. These are illustrations 
that history mattered substantially. 
C. Extensions 
We can think of several extensions: empirical, analytical, and normative. The empirical 
extension would be to extend our framework to consider additional data and periods. One would 
want to document such phenomena as the rise of the pound sterling in the late 18th century, and 
its decline in the 20th century, in order to gain a clearer understanding of the mechanics of 
persistence and dynamics of decline. For instance, if distance induces smaller frictions then the 
scope for strategic externalities might be increased as a result of technological progress. That is, 
there is no reason why persistence could not be historically dependent. 
An interesting analytical extension would be to adapt the framework under study to take into 
account other forms of path dependency; for example, in David (1985) the declining average 
costs are supplemented with switching costs, unlike what happens in the models of international 
money on which we have relied here. Suppose then that establishing a new local market for a 
given currency involves paying a set-up cost. By assumption, the set-up cost is paid once and 
for all – that is, the first time the market is created. In the cross-section that we have considered, 
it is obvious that such a dynamic feature cannot be handled. But it could very well be dealt with 
provided that more data are gathered and more periods considered. 
Finally, it would be interesting to go from the positive description offered here to more 
normative assessments. Persistence may induce the world economy to deviate from its 
“optimal” trajectory (see David (1985) and Leibowitz and Margolis (1990) for controversial 
discussions of this point in a different context). The evidence we reported of a long-run 
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association between international currencies and trade shares suggests that the resulting 
diseconomy might not be so large, at least in the year 1900. Looking at things this way could 
also help to explain why certain countries (but not others) sought institutional solutions to boost 
the use of their currency on international markets during the period under study. That we find 
U.S. leaders setting up the National Monetary Commission for experts to discuss ways and 
means to promote the international role of the dollar may be indicative that those countries for 
which the imbalance between potential and actual status was greatest (see Figure 5) find it in 
their own interest to subsidize the promotion of their currency, thus limiting the global 
diseconomy. Further analysis of these matters should be very fruitful. 
 
Conclusions 
This paper has provided the first empirical study of the determinants of international currency 
status. We did this in the context of the late 19th-century international monetary system. In line 
with the prediction of Charles Kindlberger, we did not find much evidence that currencies 
become international as a result of the issuing country’s moral worth. In contrast, we found 
evidence of the importance of size, distance, and inventory costs, evidence that is consistent 
with the prediction of search-theoretic models of international currencies. Moreover, we 
reported strong evidence of strategic externalities: currencies become international on account 
of their low liquidity premia and (conversely) had low liquidity premia on account of their 
international circulation. Such feedback, we explained, has the potential for creating persistence. 
We then estimated the size of this feedback and found it too small to generate strict path 
dependency. Nonetheless, persistence was found to be sizeable. Concrete evidence was 
provided by comparing observed monetary status in the late 19th century with its history-free, 
counterfactual equilibrium. We found that, in the late 19th century, history benefited mostly 
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European countries and disadvantaged the United States. Our model suggests imputing this to 
Europe’s earlier lead in international trade.  
The evidence in this article thus leads to conclusions related to Kindleberger’s insight that 
size is everything. Our findings strongly support his notion that, over the very long run, trade 
share is a powerful driver of international monetary leadership. This simple insight, for which 
we reported abundant evidence, should go a long way toward explaining why it is the U.S. 
dollar, not the pound sterling, that is the main international currency today. The implication 
must be that money and trade are complements. With respect to modern debates on the 
prospects of the international monetary system in the 21st century, this means that the most 
likely development should be the (delayed) emergence on the international scene of the 
currencies of new trading powers. China’s yuan is the currency that comes immediately to mind. 
Determining how long it will take for this to happen requires further work. 
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1Figure 1: Foreign Circulation of Individual Currencies in 1900:
 Number of Markets Where Given Countries’ Currencies are Traded
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Source: Flandreau and Jobst 2005. To facilitate comparison with Figure 5 below and relation with econometric
work in Section IV we have restricted the ranking to countries usable in Section IV. This makes 35
currencies/countries. This is more limited than the sample used in regression analysis in section II.
2Figure 2 : Short Term Interest Rate Differentials Vs. London and International Liquidity
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Source: Authors’ database.
3Figure 3. Equilibrium Foreign Circulation and Liquidity Premium
for Country i’s Currency
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4 Figure 4a. Currency Status and Persistence: Stable Dynamics  0<g1g2<1)
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5Figure 4.b. Currency Status and Lock-in: Unstable Dynamics (1<g1g2)
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6Figure 5 : History Measured: Actual Versus Counterfactual Number of Foreign Markets Where
Currencies Circulated in 1900
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Table 1: Explaining Foreign Circulation 
 
 LOGIT PROBIT 
 GENERAL MATCHING 
 
GOOD HOUSEKEEPING 
 
COLONIES INSTRUMENT. 
TRADE 
GENERAL MATCHING 
 
GOOD HOUSEKEEPING 
 
COLONIES INSTRUMENT. 
TRADE 
VARIABLES (I) (II) (IIIa) (IIIb) (IV) (III) (I) (Ia) (Ib) (IV) (V) (V) 
“Good housekeeping”             
on gold -0.33 
(-0.89) 
 -0.64 * 
(-2.32) 
-0.00 
(-0.01) 
-0.33 
(-0.89) 
-0.17 
(-0.88) 
-0.17 
(-0.88) 
 -0.30 * 
(-2.21) 
0.00 
(0.02) 
-0.17 
(-0.89) 
 
debt burden -0.14 * 
(-2.42) 
 -0.00 
(-0.03) 
-0.05 * 
(-1.95) 
-0.14 * 
(-2.42) 
-0.06 ** 
(-2.39) 
-0.06 ** 
(-2.39) 
 -0.00 
(-0.02) 
-0.03 * 
(-2.18) 
-0.06 ** 
(-2.39) 
 
Bond yields 0.07 
(0.60) 
 -0.72 ** 
(-6.13) 
 0.07 
(0.60) 
0.03 
(0.55) 
0.03 
(0.55) 
 -0.29 ** 
(-6.51) 
 0.03 
(0.55) 
 
GDP per capita -0.15 
(-0.59) 
 0.87 ** 
(4.79) 
1.51 ** 
(8.04) 
-0.15 
(-0.59) 
0.19 
(1.48) 
0.19 
(1.48) 
 0.50 ** 
(5.27) 
0.78 ** 
(8.32) 
0.19 
(1.46) 
 
“Matching”             
interest rate -0.99 ** 
(-5.65) 
-0.82 ** 
(-7.29) 
  -0.99 ** 
(-5.65) 
-0.42 ** 
(-5.96) 
-0.42 ** 
(-5.96) 
-0.38 ** 
(-7.97) 
  -0.42 ** 
(-5.96) 
-0.35 ** 
(-7.54) 
distance -0.76 ** 
(-6.52) 
-0.76 ** 
(-6.59) 
  -0.76 ** 
(-6.49) 
-0.41 ** 
(-6.86) 
-0.41 ** 
(-6.86) 
-0.41 ** 
(-6.83) 
  -0.42 ** 
(-6.87) 
-0.58 ** 
(-10.51) 
share in bilateral trade 0.25 ** 
(9.54) 
0.27 ** 
(10.33) 
  0.25 ** 
(9.45) 
0.11 ** 
(11.85) 
0.11 ** 
(11.85) 
0.12 ** 
(12.80) 
  0.11 ** 
(11.70) 
 
colony     -0.02 
(-0.02) 
     0.31 
(0.39) 
 
“Others”             
foreign GDP            0.37 ** 
(9.41) 
constant 4.74 
(1.75) 
4.30 ** 
(3.48) 
-7.20 ** 
(-4.50) 
-15.09 ** 
(-10.59) 
4.74 
(1.74) 
1.32 
(1.06) 
1.32 
(1.06) 
2.13 ** 
(3.43) 
-4.62 ** 
(-5.78) 
-7.91 ** 
(-11.29) 
1.36 
(1.09) 
-1.70 
(-2.02) 
coverage 2.05 ** 
(7.27) 
2.01 ** 
(7.25) 
1.41 ** 
(8.27) 
1.34 ** 
(8.12) 
2.05 ** 
(7.26) 
1.06 ** 
(7.47) 
1.06 ** 
(7.47) 
1.04 ** 
(7.43) 
0.78 ** 
(8.54) 
0.72 ** 
(8.25) 
1.06 ** 
(7.45) 
0.58 ** 
(5..5) 
number of obs. 1408 1408 1408 1408 1408 1408 1408 1408 1408 1408 1408 1408 
Pseudo R2 0.59 0.58 0.21 0.16 0.59 0.57 0.57 0.56 0.20 0.15 0.57 0.42 
log likelihood -247.23 -251.57 -470.21 -503.07 -247.23 -257.23 -257.23 -262.51 -476.08 -505.19 -257.16 -344.03 
predicted vs. observed             
0 when truly 0 83.66 83.59 83.66 84.16 83.66 83.81 83.81 83.81 83.88 84.52 83.81 82.74 
1 when truly 1 10.80 10.87 2.56 1.28 10.80 10.09 10.09 9.94 1.78 0.99 10.09 7.88 
1 when truly 0 1.28 1.35 1.28 0.78 1.28 1.14 1.14 1.14 1.07 0.43 1.14 2.20 
0 when truly 1 4.26 4.19 12.50 13.78 4.26 4.97 4.97 5.11 13.28 14.06 4.97 7.17 
 
Results refer to logit and probit estimates, z-statistics in parentheses. 
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Table 2: Matrix of Correlations between Explanatory Variables 
 
 on gold debt 
burden 
long 
term 
interest 
rate 
GDP 
per 
capita 
short 
term 
interest 
rate 
distance trade 
share 
on gold 1       
debt burden -0.21 1      
long term interest rate -0.52 0.27 1     
GDP per capita 0.45 -0.00 -0.43 1    
short term interest rate -0.17 -0.27 0.54 -0.39 1   
distance -0.09 -0.02 0.12 -0.05 0.23 1  
trade share 0.14 -0.10 -0.24 0.26 -0.27 -0.26 1 
 
Source: Authors’ database. 
 
 
 
Table 3: Estimating Strategic Externalities 
 
 (I) (II) (III) 
Equation 
 “NAIVE” PROBIT - 
OLS 
SEQUENTIAL 
MODEL 
TWO STAGE 
PROBIT 
       
r u -1.09 
(-7.10) 
-0.87 
(-4.72) 
-0.91 
(-2.83) 
 GDP per 
capita 
0.27 
(0.68) 
0.19 
(0.38) 
0.15 
(0.25) 
 democracy 
index 
-0.10 
(-1.39) 
-0.13 
(-1.46) 
-0.09 
(-0.82) 
 constant 2.27 
(0.77) 
3.36 
(0.91) 
3.59 
(0.78) 
       
 observations 35 35 35 
 adjusted R² 0.68 0.51 0.33 
       
       
u r -0.36 
(-7.06) 
-0.31 
(-6.78) 
-0.52 
(-8.12) 
 distance -0.46 
(-6.91) 
-0.38 
(-5.64 
-0.44 
(-6.28) 
 share 0.15 
(11.54) 
0.16 
(12.36) 
0.15 
(10.94) 
 coverage 1.13 
(6.92) 
1.17 
(7.04) 
1.24 
(7.09) 
 constant 2.09 
(3.12) 
1.03 
(1.61) 
2.70 
(3.73) 
       
 observations 1190 1190 1190 
 log likelihood -205.2 -207.0 -195.0 
 
Source: See text. t- and z-statistics in parentheses. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
